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Abstract: 3 
There is an increasing need for a comprehensive institutional understanding pertaining to 4 
ecosystem services (ESs) in coastal and marine fields. This paper develops a systematic 5 
framework to inform coastal and marine governance about the integration of ES concepts. 6 
First, as a theoretical basis, we analyze the generic rules that are part of the Institutional 7 
Analysis and Development (IAD) framework. Second, by an extensive literature review, we 8 
formulate a set of ES-specific rules and develop an evaluative framework for coastal and 9 
marine governance. Third, we examine this evaluative framework in a specific action situation, 10 
namely coastal strategic planning concerning Qingdao, China. Results from the literature 11 
review and the case study reveal that when designing ES-specific rules for coastal and marine 12 
governance, there are several socio-spatial and economic aspects that should be taken into 13 
account: (1) conceive of stakeholders as ES users, (2) capture the effect of ecological scaling, 14 
(3) understand ES interactions and clarify indirect impacts and causalities, (4) account for ES 15 
values, and (5) draw on economic choices for use rights to deal with ES issues. 16 
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1. Introduction 20 
Ecosystem services (ESs) are generally defined as the benefits people obtain from ecosystems 21 
(MA, 2005), along with variations of classification schemes and definitions for characterizing 22 
different ESs (e.g., Costanza et al., 1997; De Groot et al., 2010). Many associated approaches 23 
have been developed for evaluating ES values (Börger et al., 2014), modeling/mapping 24 
ecological stocks and flows (Maes et al., 2012), identifying ES interactions (Raudsepp-Hearne 25 
et al., 2010), and creating incentives of payments for ESs (Lau, 2013; Vatn, 2010). These 26 
concepts with the classifications and approaches help to explain human-nature relationships 27 
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and to widely support policies for identifying, predicting, negotiating, and managing policy 28 
consequences, which substantially contribute to sustainable development (Ingram et al., 29 
2012). 30 
To better integrate ESs in decision making, scholars have emphasized the role and importance 31 
of institutions. Adopting an institutional perspective for the analysis of ESs is helpful in 32 
understanding the structures behind the complex processes of coordination and cooperation in 33 
coastal and marine governance. For coastal and marine areas these processes typically include 34 
“bundles” of ESs (e.g., fisheries, algae energy, and tide power), resulting in trade-offs and 35 
synergies among stakeholders (Bennett et al., 2009; Raudsepp-Hearne et al., 2010). They also 36 
feature uncertainties regarding climate change and coastal degradation, resulting in a need for 37 
adaptive policy making and knowledge (Turner, 2000). Moreover, many coastal and marine 38 
ES issues are of a large scale, usually involving actors at multiple governance levels. A focus 39 
on the institutions that coordinate human actions and interactions helps to identify governance 40 
solutions based on the ES concept (Carpenter et al., 2009). 41 
In this context, it has often been argued that the integration of ESs into coastal and marine 42 
governance requires “the development of institutional arrangements that are flexible and 43 
responsive to local contexts and that are applicable at a variety of scales of management” 44 
(Raymond et al., 2013). Consequently, there has been an increasing interest in analyzing 45 
institutions for managing coastal ESs, often with a singular focus, such as fisheries, coral reefs, 46 
and wetlands (Bruckmeier & Höj Larsen, 2008; Namaalwa et al., 2013; Nursey-Bray & Rist, 47 
2009). These case studies demonstrate institutional innovations (e.g., co-management), 48 
providing experience towards fitting institutions to ecosystems. The second focus of the 49 
institutional analyses is on ES instruments aimed at improving the application of the 50 
instruments in practice (Börger et al., 2014; Lau, 2013). Finally, rather than focusing on a 51 
single issue, species, or instrument, scholars have studied institutional settings for spatial 52 
strategies used for ES governance, such as ecosystem-based management (EBM), marine 53 
spatial planning (MSP), marine protected areas (MPAs), and ocean zoning, to understand the 54 
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full range of relationships among human activities and ESs (Carollo & Reed, 2010; Francour et 55 
al., 2001; Pomeroy & Douvere, 2008; Sanchirico et al., 2010). 56 
To summarize, previous research suggests that coastal and marine governance is difficult 57 
because of ES dynamic interactions, various uncertainties, and cross-boundary issues. Scholars 58 
have struggled to determine what kind of institutional innovations may be needed, thereby 59 
either focusing on a single issue, species, or ES approach or on institutional arrangements for a 60 
certain spatial strategy. As a result, a more comprehensive institutional understanding 61 
pertaining to ESs in coastal and marine fields is still missing.  62 
The main purpose of this paper is to develop an evaluative framework for coastal and marine 63 
governance to systematically understand how institutions could facilitate the integration of ESs. 64 
Rules are a key factor to structure policy situations of human action (Crawford & Ostrom, 65 
1995). Rules provide guidance for addressing complex issues, such as access to different ESs at 66 
the same location and benefit-sharing and cost-bearing mechanisms across boundaries. We take 67 
the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework developed by Ostrom (2011) as 68 
our theoretical starting point, as the IAD framework provides a comprehensive list of generic 69 
rules that structure policy actions under a broad and dynamic social-ecological context. We 70 
then report on an extensive literature review of previous research about coastal and marine 71 
governance of ESs. On the basis of this literature review, we formulate a set of ES-specific 72 
rules and develop an evaluative framework for coastal and marine governance. Subsequently, 73 
we apply the framework to the action situation of coastal strategic planning for Qingdao, a 74 
large city in China. We conclude this paper by discussing several key socio-spatial and 75 
economic aspects that should be considered when designing ES-specific rules for coastal and 76 
marine governance. 77 
2. The IAD framework and the concept of rules 78 
The IAD framework proposed by Ostrom (2011) distinguishes itself by, among other things, “a 79 
systematic, theoretical focus on the impact of rules and norms on individual incentives in 80 
complex ecological-economic systems” (Rudd, 2004). The IAD framework provides a way to 81 
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understand a broad context of actions and interactions. Compared to other institutional analysis 82 
approaches, an important strength of the IAD framework is structurally detailing the action 83 
situation relevant to policy actors, following a systematic set of rules (Ostrom, 2011). The 84 
framework attempts to include all of the possible rules that are typical for policies. The 85 
classification of the rules is according to the impact of the rules on different elements (e.g., 86 
actors, actions, and information) of an action situation (Figure 1).  87 
 88 
Figure 1. Rules affecting the elements of an action situation (Ostrom, 2011) 89 
According to Ostrom (2011), rules are “shared understandings among those involved that refer 90 
to enforced prescriptions about what actions (or states of the world) are required, prohibited, or 91 
permitted” (p.17). The IAD framework highlights rules-in-use, which are the rules that are 92 
promulgated or otherwise established through the actual implementation of governance in 93 
action situations (McGinnis & Ostrom, 2012; Ménard, 2014). In that respect, rules-in-use 94 
directly affect the choices, behaviors, and attitudes of the actors and assist with the construction 95 
of an action situation. Therefore, these rules are essential to an institutional analysis. In our case, 96 
rules-in-use are important to comprehend the integration of ESs into coastal and marine 97 
governance.  98 
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There are seven types of rules that can be distinguished and that can influence the elements of 99 
an action situation (Figure 1). Position rules establish a set of positions or roles, which are held 100 
by different types of participants in an action situation (McGinnis, 2011; Ostrom, 2011). 101 
Boundary rules specify how the actors are chosen to enter or leave these positions, thus 102 
influencing the number, attributes, and resources of the participants (Ostrom, 2010). Choice 103 
rules specify what actions assigned to an actor in a position are allowed, obliged, and prohibited. 104 
In this way, these rules directly determine responsibilities, rights, and freedom. Aggregation 105 
rules “determine how decisions are made in an action situation” (Polski & Ostrom, 1999, p. 106 
16-17). This type of rule specifies who will be involved in the choice and how much each 107 
actor’s decision could contribute to “the transformation function from actions to intermediate 108 
or final outcomes” (McGinnis, 2011). Scope rules specify “the potential outcomes that can be 109 
affected and, working backward, the actions linked to specific outcomes” (Ostrom, 2011, p. 20). 110 
Thus, these rules delimit the factors (e.g., an actor’s understanding of authorized geographic 111 
domains) that may lead to specific outcomes of an action situation. Information rules specify 112 
what information is available to each position; these rules affect the channels of communication 113 
among the participants (Ostrom, 2010). Finally, payoff rules “affect the benefits and costs that 114 
will be assigned to particular combinations of actions and outcomes, and they establish the 115 
incentives and deterrents for action” (Ostrom, 2011, p. 20). 116 
3. ES-specific rules: An evaluative framework for coastal and marine governance 117 
Based on the list of rules developed by Ostrom (1999), an extensive literature review was 118 
conducted to gain a systematic overview of the specific rules required for integrating ES 119 
concepts into coastal and marine governance. For this purpose, we identified all of the journal 120 
publications dealing with coastal and marine governance of ESs in the electronic databases of 121 
Science Direct and Web of Science. We used the following key words in the title: “ecosystem 122 
services,” “ecosystem,” “coastal,” “marine,” “coast,” and “ocean.” We then refined the results 123 
by searching for topics related to “institution,” “management,” “planning,” and “governance.” 124 
We finally read abstracts and selected the papers that focused on applying and assessing 125 
ES-related concepts, frameworks, and approaches under the existing context of at least one 126 
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coastal and marine social-ecological systems. The social-ecological systems ranged from one 127 
certain ecosystem (e.g., a fishery and a coral reef) to multiple ecosystems within a large-scale 128 
area (e.g., MSP areas and integrated coastal zones). The policy processes varied from local, 129 
regional, national, and international scales. Finally, we ended with a database of 97 130 
peer-reviewed articles published from 2000 to 2014. Table 1 provides the results from 131 
combining the general definitions of the rules in the IAD framework with the articles on 132 
coastal and marine governance.  133 
Table 1. ES-specific rules-in-use for coastal and marine governance  134 
Rules Relevance for ESs Reference Examples 
Position -Governments act as “regulators of competition” rather than “promoters of 
development.” 
-Scientific groups act as supporters of ES knowledge. 
-Non-governmental stakeholders are included mainly as ES users to 
maintain the sustainable provision of ESs. 
Evans & Klinger, 2008; 
Freestone et al., 2014; 
Maltby et al., 2013; Mow et 
al., 2007; Pittock et al., 
2012 
Boundary -Selection criteria consider the actors’ responsibilities and ecological and 
social knowledge, as well as the potential affected users. 
-Stakeholders are involved early and throughout the entire decision-making 
process. 
Biggs et al., 2012; Börger 
et al., 2014; Halpern et al., 
2012; Holt et al., 2011; 
Katsanevakis et al., 2011 
Choice  -ES use activities are specified through choice limitations per coastal and 
marine zone. 
-Use-and-entry choices of ESs are specified by focusing on use rights.  
Day, 2002; Filatova, 2014; 
Katsanevakis et al., 2011; 
Sanchirico et al., 2010 
Aggregation -Rules stimulate a mix of top-down and bottom-up decisions to capture 
local-level ES priorities and address higher-level conflicts. 
-Authority is allocated based on the characteristics of an ecosystem and 
collective decision making. 
Bruckmeier & Höj Larsen, 
2008; Evans & Klinger, 
2008; Valman, 2013 
Scope  -Institutions match with ecological scales to determine ES allocation and 
efficient environmental outcomes. 
-Interactions among ESs and interrelationships among relevant users are 
Bennett et al., 2009; 




specified. Raudsepp-Hearne et al., 
2010 
Information -Information about ES conditions is incorporated in decision-making 
processes.  
-Ecosystem demands and social-cultural values are clarified. 
-Information is available on how people use and impact ESs, particularly 
regarding cumulative and indirect impacts. 
-Information on where ESs occur is specified in spatial terms to make the 
decision-making process transparent. 
Bryan et al., 2010; Halpern 
et al., 2008; Lopes & 
Videira, 2013; Potts et al.,  
2014; 
Payoff -Benefits and losses are understood from an economic-oriented perspective, 
which considers impacts and causalities. 
Bruckmeier & Höj Larsen, 
2008; Busch et al., 2011; 
Kay et al., 2003 
 135 
Position Rules 136 
The position rules focus on which actors should be involved in the action situation and on 137 
establishing the positions or roles of the actors. Previous studies suggest that the governance 138 
of coastal and marine ESs should include relevant governments (and their agencies), scientific 139 
groups, and a range of non-governmental stakeholders (e.g., private institutions, coastal 140 
citizens, and non-governmental organizations [NGOs]). With respect to the positions of these 141 
three groups of actors, it is argued that the governments should be able to play the role of 142 
“regulators of competition” rather than “promoters of development” (Pittock et al., 2012). The 143 
traditional command-and-control position of governments is not flexible and effective enough 144 
to address the complexities concerning ESs. Therefore, the literature suggests that the 145 
governments should transfer their position to coordinating and facilitating social incentives 146 
through regulatory support. For instance, the governments could ensure strategic alliances of 147 
multi-layered objectives and create clear accountability to stimulate co-management and 148 
tradable markets for ESs (Maltby et al., 2013; Mansfield, 2006; Nielsen et al., 2004). To help 149 
the governments better perform this new role, scientific groups are generally seen in a 150 
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collaborative role with the governments involved. Throughout the years, experts, advisory 151 
bodies, and technical agencies have actively participated as planning consultants, technical 152 
supporters, or ES knowledge accommodators; consequently, they strongly contribute to 153 
defining the monitoring scope of the ecosystems, assessing impacts, evaluating plans, and 154 
providing tools (Evans & Klinger, 2008; Maynard et al., 2011; Namaalwa et al., 2013). 155 
Finally, the previous studies on coastal and marine governance also emphasize, in particular, 156 
the role of non-governmental stakeholders as active actors for managing ESs. The literature 157 
points out, for instance, that marine industrial manufacturers, fishermen, and tourists often 158 
perform the role of ES users; whereas at the same time, they should also take the 159 
responsibility for guaranteeing a sustainable provision of ESs. Due to the multiple demands of 160 
interlinked ESs and associated conflicts among the ES users, it is necessary to coordinate the 161 
contribution of different interest groups (Mow et al., 2007). NGOs, in particular, usually 162 
become a successful cooperator to deal with the conflicts by promoting initiatives for new 163 
forms of ES governance, such as regional agreement making for sea use and regional 164 
committee building for securing marine protection measures (Freestone et al., 2014). It is also 165 
argued that non-governmental stakeholders should be active in bringing in diverse 166 
perspectives, preferences, feedback, and local knowledge, thereby contributing to the 167 
development of plans as evaluators (Hauck et al., 2013; Mow et al., 2007).  168 
Boundary Rules 169 
Boundary rules determine what criteria should be used to select participants and determine 170 
when the participants should enter or leave their positions. Previous studies first emphasize that 171 
selection criteria should consider the responsibilities about who is involved in coastal and 172 
marine governance, on-the-ground ecological and social knowledge, and the intended 173 
audience for governance processes and results (Holt et al., 2011; Seppelt et al., 2012). Among 174 
these criteria, more attention has been paid to potentially affected actors, hereby expanding the 175 
scope of participation that used to focus only on direct users (Halpern et al., 2012; 176 
Haines-Young & Potschin, 2014). One reason for this trend is that people tend to realize the 177 
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importance of the long-term benefits for well-being (e.g., habitat maintenance and climate 178 
regulation). Another reason is that the dynamic interactions among ESs often cause off-site 179 
effects on the stakeholders at different scales. Another lesson from previous research is that 180 
boundary rules should enable the stakeholders to be involved early and throughout the entire 181 
decision-making process, rather than only being consulted at the final stage (Börger et al., 2014; 182 
Hanna, 2008; Katsanevakis et al., 2011). Their engagement would facilitate solutions for 183 
conflicting goals, monitoring and accounting for ES flows, and detecting anthropogenic 184 
disturbances on the ecosystems (Biggs et al., 2012; Hauck et al., 2013; Mow et al., 2007; 185 
Pittock et al., 2012).  186 
Choice Rules  187 
The choice rules focus on allowing, obliging, and prohibiting specific actions regarding coastal 188 
and marine uses (i.e., what actions participants may, may not, and/or must take in governing 189 
ESs). The choice rules should specify certain actions by setting different choice limitations 190 
per coastal and marine zone. Specifically, the ecological conditions, use functions, and 191 
conservation objectives of each zone determine what activities are allowed (e.g., a nature 192 
reserve) or are prohibited (e.g., discharging pollution and reclamation) for each area (Day, 193 
2002). Such rules are helpful to avoid exclusiveness for certain ESs and to encourage 194 
multi-utilization (Katsanevakis et al., 2011; Sanchirico et al., 2010). Meanwhile, to better 195 
manage ES uses, previous research also presents that the choice rules should focus on use 196 
rights as a way to specify use-and-entry choices per zone. Examples are permits and 197 
economic-oriented choices per zone for use rights (Beaudoin & Pendleton, 2012; 198 
Katsanevakis et al., 2011). The choices for use rights are gradually required for linking with 199 
economic mechanisms (e.g., allowing a tradable market to sell and buy coastal developing 200 
rights for using vulnerable ESs) (Filatova, 2014). 201 
Aggregation Rules  202 
The aggregation rules specify how decisions are being made in the governance of coastal and 203 
marine ESs. The literature review shows that these rules should stimulate a mix of top-down 204 
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and bottom-up decisions to capture local-level ES priorities and address higher-level conflicts 205 
(Evans & Klinger, 2008; Goldman-Benner et al., 2012). Typically, in most coastal and marine 206 
cases, the governments are decisive in the final approval of policies, plans, strategies, and 207 
projects relevant for ESs. However, there is an increasing empowerment of the “weak” groups. 208 
Currently, the governments are more willing to provide decisive room (e.g., arrange fishery 209 
co-management and MPAs establishment) for local resource users and conservation interest 210 
groups as a way to enhance ES preservation and responses to higher-level plans (Bruckmeier 211 
& Höj Larsen, 2008; Kalikoski et al., 2002; Olsson et al., 2004a). Meanwhile, a certain degree 212 
of centralized decision making is still necessary to provide strategic views and comprehensive 213 
methods for local initiatives. In addition, to face cross-border and large-scale ES issues, the 214 
aggregation rules should allocate the authorities following the characteristics of an ecosystem 215 
(e.g., its scale). ES concept holds “the possibility of new collaborative decision making” 216 
(Pittock et al., 2012, p.118), such as the catchment management bodies in Australia (Maynard 217 
et al., 2011) and the Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission (Valman, 2013).  218 
Scope Rules 219 
The scope rules pertaining to ESs determine the understandings that affect the outcomes of ES 220 
governance. Previous studies show that the scope rules should take ecological scale into 221 
consideration (Day, 2002; Holt et al., 2011). Such geographical focus could determine how to 222 
allocate ESs and how to produce efficient and sustainable outcomes. For instance, there are 223 
rules of spatial partitions for development, such as marine wind energy, tourism, and habitat 224 
preservation, based on ecological features and scales (Katsanevakis et al., 2011). Setting 225 
institutions, such as legislations, should match the characteristics of the ecosystem that these 226 
institutions apply to as much as possible (Ekstrom & Young, 2009); otherwise, their 227 
mismatches could result in high transaction costs and less efficient outcomes (Hanna, 2008). 228 
Besides, ES interactions (i.e., trade-offs and synergies) and related user interrelationships 229 
should be clarified as part of the scope of the decision-making process. Then, the range of 230 
decision outcomes would be limited to particular ecological areas and to groups of affected 231 
people. This clarification is critical to reduce conflicting policy objectives and use competitions 232 
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(Bennett et al., 2009; Raudsepp-Hearne et al., 2010). Managing interactions could be done by 233 
identifying the conflicting objectives and transforming a single-species focus to a 234 
multiple-service focus (Evans & Klinger, 2008; Wilkinson et al., 2013).  235 
Information Rules 236 
The information rules specify which ES-related information is available and necessary for 237 
stakeholders. Previous studies about coastal and marine governance indicate that the 238 
information rules should serve to clarify information on the following four aspects. First, 239 
information about ES conditions (e.g., ES flows, functions, baselines, thresholds, benefits, and 240 
connections) should be incorporated in the decision-making processes and policy measures 241 
(Pittock et al., 2012; Potts et al., 2014). Obtaining information about ES conditions may cause 242 
beneficial changes in the actors’ behaviors and the policy priorities (Salzman et al., 2001). 243 
Second, the information rules should clarify what people want from the ecosystems, focusing 244 
on the diversity of the demands and the social-cultural values attached to the services (Lopes 245 
& Videira, 2013; Maes et al., 2012). Such information is helpful to integrate multiple goals, 246 
conduct cost-benefit analyses, and create dialogue about how ESs can be incorporated within 247 
management practices (Laurans & Mermet, 2014; Matzdorf & Meyer, 2014). Third, the 248 
impacts of coastal and marine activities on ESs, especially their cumulative and indirect effects, 249 
are another primary input that the stakeholders need (Evans & Klinger, 2008; Halpern et al., 250 
2008). Such understanding could benefit the formulation of a long-term goal and solutions for 251 
conflicts. Fourth, the previous studies emphasize spatial and visual information, which is 252 
important to improving decision-making transparency and to better allocating ESs. Spatial 253 
information and visual information, in particular, could illustrate where activities, impacts, 254 
risks, conflicts, and connections could occur simultaneously (Bryan et al., 2010; Maes et al., 255 
2012).  256 
Payoff Rules 257 
Finally, the payoff rules for ES governance affect the benefits and the costs caused by the 258 
conflicts involving indirect impacts and causalities. Previous research shows that the payoff 259 
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rules should be informed by the mechanisms that provide straightforward cost-and-benefit 260 
understandings, such as economic-oriented mechanisms. It frequently appears that the 261 
trade-offs from policy choices occur between a private interest in one service and a public 262 
interest in the same service or a competing service (Howe et al., 2014). For instance, energy 263 
users could benefit from offshore wind development, while tourists would bear the cost of 264 
losing recreation services (Busch et al., 2011). The payoff rules should focus on addressing 265 
such gain-and-loss issues by identifying ES values and creating economic incentives to change 266 
the individuals’ activities in policies in terms of economic-oriented measures (Boisvert et al., 267 
2013; Lockie, 2013). Central to these measures is the general rule of “who uses who pays” or 268 
“gain more pay more.” Approaches such as resource rents, mooring fees, carbon trading 269 
markets, wetland banks, pollution taxes, and other payments for ESs are in line with these 270 
general principles (Bruckmeier & Höj Larsen, 2008; Kay et al., 2003).  271 
4. Case study: Qingdao Coastal Strategic Planning 272 
To apply the framework, we examined a specific action situation, namely coastal strategic 273 
planning for Qingdao, China, from 2008 to 2014. In this specific action situation, the actors in 274 
diverse positions have made choices among the available options for managing coastal ESs. 275 
These choices were made according to the information these actors could access about the 276 
ecosystem conditions and the gains and losses of potential outcomes. The governance structure 277 
involves three levels: the Shandong provincial government, the Qingdao municipal 278 
government, and the relevant district and county governments (in this paper also referred to as 279 
local governments). Qingdao is located on the southern coast of the Shandong Peninsula in 280 
East China (Figure 2). In 2014, Qingdao covered a territorial area of 11,282 km2 and an ocean 281 
area of 12,240 km2, where the coastal area was 3,488 km2. Qingdao is one of the largest 282 
coastal economic centers in China. Its coastal area has been rapidly developed for 283 
international sea ports, large aquaculture areas, industrial parks, residential areas, and tourism 284 
centers. The most important ESs in Qingdao include the provision of seafood and material, 285 
transportation, coastal spatial resources, water purification, tourism, and the maintenance of 286 
wetland habitats and biodiversity. However, the ecological functions have been threatened by 287 
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a long history of over-extraction, severe pollution from territorial development, and climate 288 
change.  289 
 290 
Figure 2. Qingdao and the Shandong Province 291 
Recently, Qingdao’s coastal governance has implemented innovative approaches (e.g., 292 
establishing multiple-use zoning and enforcing ecological compensation), which have been 293 
first introduced in several strategic plans (e.g., the Overall Urban Plan of Qingdao for 294 
2011–2020). However, despite all of the efforts, the entire range of ESs was not taken into 295 
account (Li et al., 2015). The strategic plans are part of a critical action situation, in which the 296 
actors’ behaviors and ES utilization have been greatly affected and structured through a range 297 
of operating constraints, facilitating our insights into the specific rules-in-use.  298 
5. Data collection and analysis  299 
For the case study, the primary data included document analyses and 24 semi-structured 300 
interviews with key stakeholders. A number of spatial plans, legislations, regulations, 301 
newspapers, and official reports were collected to gain information about the institutional 302 
settings of Qingdao’s coastal strategic planning. The Appendix provides the complete list of 303 
key documents for this case, such as the Protection and Development Plan for Qingdao Marine 304 
and Coastal Areas (2014) and the General Plan of Qingdao West Coast New Area (2014). 305 
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Subsequently, to gain in-depth understanding of the rules-in-use, a mixture of stakeholders was 306 
selected, including experts, planners, and officials, from relevant research institutes and 307 
different administrative entities (Table 2). All of the interviewees have been involved in the 308 
development of coastal strategic plans and had a certain knowledge background on coasts and 309 
oceans. The seven types of ES-specific rules-in-use formed the basis of the interview guide, 310 
which mainly consisted of open-ended questions. We analyzed the collected documents and 311 
the interview transcripts by using content analysis (Krippendorf, 2004). The evaluative 312 
framework (Table 1) was adopted as a coding system. With the assistance of Atlas.ti software, 313 
we coded and aggregated the documents and transcripts to identify references, including each 314 
type of rule, as well as ongoing discussions about these rules.  315 
Table 2. List of interviewees and the sectors and organizations they represent 316 
Sectors Organizations Numbers of 
Interviewees 
Economy and Social 
Development 
Shandong Province Development & Reform Commission 1 
Qingdao Development & Reform Commission 1 
Urban Planning Shandong Housing and Urban-Rural Development Department  2 
Shandong Construction Engineering Administration 1 
Qingdao Urban Planning Bureau 1 
Qingdao Academy of Urban Planning and Design 1 
Qingdao Association of City Planning 1 
Environment Shandong Environmental Protection Department 1 
Shandong Environmental Planning and Design Institute 2 
Shandong Environmental Approval of Construction Projects 
Reception Centre 
1 
Qingdao Environmental Protection Bureau 1 
Land Use Shandong Province Land Survey and Planning Institute 2 
Ocean and Fishery Shandong Oceanic and Fisheries Department 4 
Qingdao Ocean and Fisheries Bureau 2 
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Qingdao Institute of Marine Geology 1 
The First Institute of Oceanography, State Oceanic Administration 1 
Ocean University of China  1 
6. An institutional analysis of coastal strategic planning for Qingdao City  317 
After analyzing the data from the case, we summarized the key findings in Table 3. We not only 318 
listed ES-specific rules-in-use, but we also included ongoing discussions about these rules. In 319 
the remainder of this section, we discuss the results for each type of rules-in-use for Qingdao’s 320 
coastal strategic planning practice. 321 
Table 3. ES-specific rules-in-use in Qingdao’s coastal strategic planning practice 322 
Rules  Existing rules and ongoing development in Qingdao for ES management 
Position -Governmental authorities act as “promoters of planning and implementation” and “supporters 
of social incentives and innovations.” 
-Technical agencies and experts act as consultants, technical supporters, and knowledge 
accommodators to guarantee the rationality and feasibility of decision making. 
-NGOs and citizens are less active actors; due to a lack of capacity, they are often unable to 
transfer their ES concerns to strategic levels. 
Boundary -Selection criteria consider responsibilities based on certain administrative boundaries, 
professional and on-the-ground knowledge, and the inclusion of intended audiences for marine 
economic development rather than ecological development. 
-Participation is restricted to consultation in the preparation and final formulation stages. 
Choice  -Ecological functions and social attributes per zone determine use choices; activities that 
consume natural space or damage ecosystems are strictly controlled. 
-Choices for ES access focus on the authorization of permits and the bidding/auction of use 
rights. 
Aggregation -A hierarchical setup for decision making is made for the provincial and municipal 




-Authorities are not allocated at an ecological scale, but they are allocated on the basis of 
government sectors to collectively accommodate ES use and supply. 
Scope  -An abstract “land-sea integration” principle is promoted to match the institution with the 
ecological scales.  
-Planning outcomes are influenced by a limited awareness of ES trade-offs and affected users.
Information -Limited and indirect information on ES conditions are accessible, owing to the lacking of a 
systematic definition and classification of ESs. 
-Supply-and-demand information is provided to deal with multi-targets of ES uses, informing 
decision-making priorities. 
-There is little information about how people impact ESs for strategic decision making, 
particularly concerning indirect impacts and cumulative impacts. 
-There is little information on ES values and spatial modeling results in practice, due to a low 
level of acceptance among policymakers. 
Payoff -The distribution of benefits and losses results from the consumption of limited tradable ESs 
and is based on economic incentives. 
-Administrative penalties emphasize the illegal utilization of development rights or irregular 
authorization of use permits. 
 323 
Position Rules 324 
Qingdao’s coastal strategic planning involves governments, scientific groups, and 325 
non-governmental stakeholders and allocates diverse responsibilities to each of these groups at 326 
different stages. These allocations have implications for the consideration of ESs. Qingdao’s 327 
municipal government, Shandong’s provincial government, and the local governments act as 328 
“promoters of planning and implementation,” as well as “supporters of social incentives and 329 
innovations.” On the one hand, the governments quantitatively set planning goals and allow 330 
two authoritative agencies, the Environmental Protection Sector and the Marine and Fishery 331 
Sector, to be responsible for coastal and marine protection in the entire planning process. 332 
However, both of these agencies appear to wield an insignificant amount of influence on the 333 
17 
 
planning practice. As an environmental planning expert from the Shandong Environmental 334 
Planning and Design Institute stated, “To facilitate the role of environmental departments in 335 
strategic planning, there is a problem, namely how to place them on an equal footing with other 336 
departments to communicate. … Tools for environmental departments to coordinate other 337 
sectors are limited.” On the other hand, the governments act as supporters for the foundations 338 
for incentives and innovations of ES governance. For example, to stimulate the market of 339 
coastal and marine services and guarantee fairness, the municipal government established the 340 
Qingdao International Marine Property Trading Center for users.  341 
The results show that the governments often encounter a shortage of planning expertise when 342 
they perform these two roles. Therefore, technical agencies and experts have been asked to 343 
work as important consultants and technical supporters to guarantee the rationality and 344 
feasibility of decision making. Meanwhile, these scientific groups accommodate ES-related 345 
knowledge into planning from the early preparatory stage to the approval step (e.g., the 346 
Protection and Development Plan for Qingdao Marine and Coastal Areas, 2014).  347 
NGOs (e.g., the Qingdao Society for Environmental Sciences and the Qingdao Association of 348 
City Planning), interest groups (e.g., environmental industries), and citizens are also involved 349 
in Qingdao’s coastal strategic planning practice. However, they have barely informed the 350 
strategic planners of their ES concerns due to a weaker capacity and position than the major 351 
interest groups (e.g., high-income companies). For instance, a representative of the Qingdao 352 
Association of City Planning expressed his concerns as follows:  353 
“Diverse associations in China, including us, are social organizations. Our 354 
development processes and social status are quite different from NGOs of developed 355 
countries. Due to the small scale, the low quality, and the weak position, the 356 
influence of our social organizations on governments is small. The role that we can 357 
play [on planning] is very limited.” 358 
In China’s strategic planning context, citizens’ participation is generally perceived to be poor. 359 
Although implicit decisions on the supply or conservation of ESs are considerably in the 360 
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personal interest of citizen – their well-being in general and their livelihood in particular are 361 
affected by coastal strategic plans – citizens do not appear to be aware of the actual and 362 
potential influence from strategic plans, which results in a lack of incentives to participate. This 363 
indicates that more communication and interaction between governments and citizens might be 364 
crucial. This is also the case in Qingdao, as an official from the Municipal Development & 365 
Reform Commission observed: “Our plan is so big, and citizens mainly care about their 366 
individual livelihood rather than macro-level economic goals or to what extent the plan would 367 
be developed at strategic level.” By contrast, the high-income firms, as significant ES users and 368 
economic-benefit producers in the market, are viewed as being very important to the strategic 369 
developments. These major interest groups are able to gain more information and have more 370 
opportunities to express their demands in the early phase of the planning investigation. In 371 
addition, they often perform as evaluators and provide feedback on the drafts of plans. This 372 
feedback is often given more attention by the decision makers.  373 
Boundary Rules  374 
The existing boundary rules in Qingdao’s coastal strategic planning point to the following 375 
selection criteria. The governments and relevant agencies are inclusive according to their 376 
responsibilities in certain administrative boundaries regarding coastal protection and 377 
development. Professional knowledge and on-the-ground understanding of social and 378 
ecological development are each viewed as a main factor in selecting scientific groups in the 379 
planning processes. In addition, the existing boundary rules emphasize the participation of 380 
intended audiences for developing both traditional and high-tech marine industries. These 381 
audiences could contribute to plans for driving the marine economy (e.g., new energy, 382 
biotechnology, equipment manufacture, transportation, and tourism) over a short-term period. 383 
Such preference of selection is illustrated in many strategic plans (e.g., the General Plan of 384 
Qingdao West Coast New Area, 2014). By contrast, there is less preference for including 385 
ecological interests that lie in ecological/environmental industries. As an official from the 386 
Provincial Development & Reform Commission stated: “Marine and coastal ecosystem 387 
protection is not a critical part of the plans. This topic is included solely for the integrity of 388 
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strategic planning. … The main goal is taking advantage of competitive marine industries to 389 
stimulate economic development.”  390 
The existing boundary rules also determine that the responsible authorities and scientific 391 
groups are involved throughout the decision-making process. The participation of other 392 
relevant agencies and non-governmental stakeholders is restricted to the preparation and final 393 
consulting phases (see also Position Rules). The stakeholders that could be affected outside of 394 
the municipal jurisdiction have also been involved early and entered the planning arena. One 395 
typical example is the development of the Dongjiakou Port (with a port capacity of 600 396 
million tons), which would disturb the fishery resources and produce environmental pollution 397 
across the municipal borders (Rizhao Government, 2011). Local communities from the 398 
nearby counties and their county governments presented the problems at an early stage. Their 399 
activities led to meetings for the understanding of conflicts, negotiations, and a modification 400 
of the plan (Shandong Environmental Protection Department, 2012). Obviously, to address 401 
ES issues, it would be beneficial to consider the involvement of the related stakeholders.  402 
Choice Rules 403 
The choice rules in Qingdao specify users’ actions according to limitations per zone. To avoid 404 
the negative impacts of activities and improve the multi-utilization of services, Chinese 405 
functional zoning schemes generally clarify what activities are allowed, obliged, and prohibited 406 
and under what conditions the multi-services (e.g., the provision of fisheries and spatial 407 
resource for a port) can be used for each zone. Ecological functions and social attributes per 408 
zone determine the choices of ES uses (Douvere, 2008). Particularly regarding Jiaozhou Bay, 409 
which is Qingdao’s key production area of ESs, activities are strictly controlled to deal with 410 
the growing losses of natural space and ecosystem functions. The choices are specified into 411 
prohibiting reclamation, protecting key wetlands and natural coastlines, limiting pollution, and 412 
restricting engineering constructions along certain coastal areas (Qingdao Urban Planning 413 
Bureau, 2015). These choice rules show a general desire to create a space for ES-thinking 414 
among the dominant discourse of “pollution control.” A typical example is to emphasize 415 
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wetland connectivity and landscape diversity in zoning. Such consideration could enable 416 
Qingdao to modify the effects of social and natural disturbances, depending on the ecosystem 417 
itself. As a result, a stable provision of services can be guaranteed to a certain extent. 418 
Associated with the limitations per zone, choices for ES access have also been developed on 419 
the basis of permit authorization and markets of use rights. According to the Regulations of 420 
Qingdao Municipality on the Use of Sea Areas (Committee of People's Congress of Qingdao 421 
Municipality, 1999), the precondition for ES production per area is to obtain a permit. Sea-use 422 
rights can be chosen through bidding and auction in Qingdao (Huangdao Government, 2015). 423 
Such economic-oriented choices allow for the creation of scarcity for sand provision and 424 
reclamation space; however, intangible and vulnerable ESs are often excluded. 425 
Aggregation Rules 426 
This case also shows a certain degree of a mix between top-down and bottom-up decision 427 
making about ESs. In China, it has always been emphasized that for strategic and 428 
comprehensive decisions, the national, provincial, and municipal governments reserve the 429 
final responsibility. In this case, the Shandong provincial government and Qingdao’s municipal 430 
government have the major part of the decision-making power of the strategic planning in terms 431 
of granting final approval and validity. Nevertheless, despite the hierarchical setup for decision 432 
making, some determinative power has been gradually moved towards the local governments; 433 
however, little power has moved towards the local interest groups to decide on the supply of 434 
ESs. For instance, the district and county governments are allowed to decide the spatial plan 435 
for marine nature reserves and special marine protection areas for locally important estuarial 436 
wetlands. As a planning expert from the Institute of Marine Geology stated: “When we collect 437 
data and conduct field work to plan for protected areas, local governments know their own area 438 
quite well. They could suggest and decide which areas should be protected, and which they 439 
prefer for economic development.”  440 
Rather than allocating authorities at an ecological scale, fragmented authorities for coastal and 441 
marine governance are typical for Qingdao. The responsibilities for coastal and marine 442 
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governance have been allocated among an array of government sectors, such as transportation, 443 
forest, agriculture, land, water, and marine and fishery. Consequently, sectoral integration 444 
mainly takes place in the final strategic planning as a compromise to coordinate various ES use 445 
and supply in the final draft of plans (e.g., the Overall Urban Plan of Qingdao for 2011–2020). 446 
At the moment, a management commission based on the basin scale is being established in 447 
Qingdao, which holds the promise of causing lower compromising costs and a better 448 
consensus (Committee of People's Congress of Qingdao Municipality, 2014). 449 
Scope Rules  450 
In Qingdao, the scope rules specify planning outcomes involving the understanding of 451 
ecological scales and ES interactions. Major strategic plans and relevant policy documents 452 
emphasize the critical principle of “attunement, coordination, and land-sea integration” for 453 
coastal and marine governance concerning ecological issues. For instance, in the Protection 454 
and Development Plan for Qingdao Marine and Coastal Areas (2014, p.38), this principle is 455 
explained as follows: 456 
“Taking the sustainable development of marine ecological environment as a starting 457 
point, planning should integrate land and sea based on marine environmental 458 
capacity. The social-economic development and ecological protection requirements 459 
of the neighboring land should be sufficiently considered for coordinating diverse 460 
interests.”  461 
Several interviewees criticized the abstract meaning of the principle and the difficulties in 462 
interpreting the principle in the planning practice. As an official from the Shandong Oceanic 463 
and Fisheries Department said: “It is an abstract principle that is difficult to explain. … The 464 
land-sea integration has been promoted for years, but until now, there is little ‘real’ and good 465 
fulfillment concerning environmental protection.” For instance, an outcome of this scope rule 466 
is the control of land-sourced discharge based on sea water environmental capacity. However, 467 
to get rid of the restriction of pollution control on local industrial development, local 468 
governments tend to predict less discharge amounts in the early planning stage for 469 
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environmental management. Consequently, the environmental protection of the land-sea 470 
integration is hardly achieved. 471 
Besides, planning outcomes are limited to certain areas and affected users from ES 472 
interactions in Qingdao, particularly with regard to coastal reclamation. The documents that 473 
we studied (e.g., the Qingdao Municipal Regulations of Jiaozhou Bay Protection, 2015) 474 
strongly emphasize setting forbidden geographical domains for reclamation. The scope rules 475 
aim to reduce the irreversible damage on aggregated services (e.g., habitat maintenance, 476 
biodiversity, and cultural heritage) and the well-being of people, not only at one location but 477 
also at far distant locations. Other ES interrelationships that may occur on-site and off-site are 478 
also acknowledged and negotiated in the planning practice, such as the trade-offs between 479 
marine industrial production and wetland biodiversity maintenance, as well as the conflicts 480 
between aquaculture and water purification. There is only a small part of multiple ES uses and 481 
their interactions considered in decision making to coordinate users’ interests and use patterns. 482 
However, as an expert from the Shandong Environmental Planning and Design Institute noted 483 
about the outcomes: “The consideration of how to balance these relationships and how to put 484 
them into practice was not written explicitly in the planning documents.” Therefore, the 485 
integration of ES interactions and users’ interrelationships into the current scope of Qingdao’s 486 
coastal strategic planning practice seem to be less distinct. 487 
Information Rules  488 
To facilitate the decision making on the spatial allocation of resources in a more rational way, 489 
coastal strategic planning requires an understanding of current natural conditions. In Qingdao, 490 
the rules for information about conditions are not designed based on a systematic definition 491 
and classification of ESs. Thus, current conditional information only indirectly illustrates 492 
some key ecological conditions and processes by focusing on coastline resources, marine 493 
geology, rivers, and biodiversity.  494 
Information on the supply and demand of coastal and marine resources is also required to 495 
coordinate multiple uses. In addition, the supply-and-demand information could affect the 496 
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planners’ priorities regarding decision making. Thus, urgent problems could be addressed, 497 
such as the maintenance of livelihood relying on fisheries. As a planning expert from the First 498 
Institute of Oceanography explained:  499 
“Our main focus [of information collection] is currently on demand, location, and 500 
environment. Our per capita coastline is too short, the per capita sea area is too small, 501 
and the use intensity is so high. … The coastline in Qingdao has been entirely used. 502 
Except for meeting the demand of tourism, industries, and urban development, the 503 
rest of the coastal areas have been dominated by aquaculture. … We need food 504 
firstly. It concerns critical livelihood.” 505 
Furthermore, findings show that there is a lack of information rules concerning how people 506 
impact ESs at a strategic level. A number of legislations and regulations (e.g., Shandong 507 
Province Marine Environmental Protection Regulations) call for impact information that 508 
focuses on environmental quality at the project level. Moreover, either the indirect impacts or 509 
cumulative impacts are asked to perform a role mainly in decision making about project 510 
constructions. However, budget and time are restricted for the collection of this kind of 511 
information. As a result, secondary data have become the main source of information, such as 512 
previous local studies and environmental impact assessments on a similar type of project.  513 
The fourth type of information rules regarding ES valuation and spatial illustration is absent in 514 
coastal strategic planning due to a low level of acceptance in Qingdao. For instance, research 515 
institutes try to provide policymakers with results of ES valuation, ecological capital, and maps 516 
for cost-and-benefit analysis for planning. However, such information is not considered as a 517 
necessity and a reliable support in practice. The policymakers hesitate to use the data. As an 518 
official from the Qingdao Ocean and Fisheries Bureau explained: “The assessed values are too 519 
large to accept and apply. … The models are not based on an adequate understanding of the 520 
environmental baseline and dynamic changes. … The research thus seems unreliable.” As a 521 
result, this kind of information is hardly provided for coordination and consensus.  522 
Payoff Rules  523 
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Finally, the results demonstrate that the payoff rules for Qingdao’s coastal strategic planning 524 
emphasize distributing benefits and losses caused by using marketable ESs based on economic 525 
incentives. The major payoff rules relevant for sea use and marine environmental pollution 526 
adhere to the project level, sticking to the key principle of “who develops who protects, who 527 
benefits who compensates” (Committee of People's Congress of Qingdao Municipality, 2014; 528 
Office of People's Government of Qingdao City, 2009). The payoff rules refer to a wide range 529 
of ESs, such as water purification, wetland maintenance, coastal landscape, and flood 530 
prevention (Committee of People's Congress of Qingdao Municipality, 2010). Only a partial 531 
consumption of tradable ESs (e.g., fisheries) and ES proxies (e.g., use rights) with direct 532 
causalities has been considered in terms of fees to generate compensation effects. Sea-use fees 533 
and ecological damage fees are designed to charge for users to influence their choices of 534 
targeted service, activity location, and use pattern by distributing costs in a certain way. Such 535 
financial resources from these fees are then allocated for ecological restoration and 536 
environmental protection, which may collectively create positive effects for the region.  537 
Apart from the economic-oriented rules that create incentives to influence private behaviors, 538 
administrative payoff rules are also in place to guarantee protection. Increasingly, penalties for 539 
a range of the illegal utilization of development rights or the irregular authorization of use 540 
permits are introduced and emphasized in legal terms.  541 
7. Conclusion and Reflection  542 
This paper proposed a systematic framework that reflects coastal and marine governance with 543 
regard to the integration of ESs. To achieve this objective, we gained a theoretical 544 
understanding of the rules that are part of the IAD framework and reviewed previous studies 545 
to see how the framework of rules-in-use could be operationalized when referring to coastal 546 
and marine issues. We then applied this framework to Qingdao’s coastal strategic planning 547 
practice. Taken together, the results from the literature review and the case study revealed at 548 
least five socio-spatial and economic aspects, which should be considered for the further 549 
understanding and design of ES-specific rules for coastal and marine governance: (1) 550 
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conceive of stakeholders as ES users, (2) capture the effect of ecological scaling, (3) 551 
understand ES interactions and clarify indirect impacts and causalities, (4) account for ES 552 
values, and (5) draw on economic choices for use rights to deal with ES issues. 553 
First, it is important to conceive of stakeholders as ES users when designing rules. Both the 554 
literature review and the case study revealed the poor situation of “weak” groups. The 555 
well-being of these groups strongly relies on the development and maintenance of ESs in 556 
many coastal regions like Qingdao. These groups often lack the capacity, power, willingness, 557 
and possibilities to maintain their own benefits or to transfer ES concerns to strategic plans. 558 
Accordingly, ES-specific rules should define the role and responsibility of the users in legal 559 
terms (position rules) and encourage the participation of the “weak” users (boundary rules) 560 
(Nielsen et al., 2004). Also, certain choice and payoff rules should be formulated based on the 561 
users following economic principles, thus regulating the users’ activities and specifying “who 562 
uses who pays.” The uptake of ES-user thinking will facilitate the involvement of more 563 
short-term and long-term interests of users. In addition, this uptake will also enable a better 564 
understanding of the ecological and social complexities and ways to deal with them (Norgaard 565 
& Baer, 2005). 566 
Second, the effect of ecological scaling should be given specific attention. Our case study and 567 
previous research (e.g., Hanna, 2008; Holt et al., 2011) uncovered the inherent fragmentation 568 
of governance in many coastal and marine regions with regard to administrative 569 
responsibilities, sectoral legislations, and strategic information. Accordingly, ecological 570 
scaling should be captured by ES-specific rules to address the substantial resistance from 571 
traditional institutional arrangements against efficient and flexible ES governance. For 572 
example, decision making should be based on an ecological scale (authority rules), such as the 573 
promising attempt by Qingdao to establish a new basin-scaled authority. The effect of 574 
ecological scaling should also be captured when designing choice rules (specifying activities 575 
per zone according to natural attributes), information rules (providing reliable knowledge of 576 
affected ecological areas), and scope rules (evaluating outcomes at an ecological scale).  577 
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Third, in designing ES-specific rules for coastal and marine governance, it is essential to 578 
better understand ES interactions and clarify indirect impacts and causalities (Bennett et al., 579 
2009). The Qingdao case showed the difficulties of identifying, clarifying, and 580 
operationalizing the complex ES interactions in practice, which is in line with findings from 581 
other ES studies (Howe et al., 2014). The majority of the rules in Qingdao still emphasize 582 
direct pollution and environmental factors (e.g., water, air, and soil) rather than a systematic 583 
view via ESs. Thus, ES-specific rules should enhance local participation, monitoring, research, 584 
and a knowledge-sharing platform about ecological dynamics and causalities (information 585 
rules). The understanding of ES interactions should also be involved in, for example, 586 
controlling conflicting activities and encouraging compatible ES uses (choice rules), finding 587 
potentially influenced audiences (boundary rules), and setting geographical domains to limit 588 
off-site impacts (scope rules). 589 
Fourth, the rules for coastal and marine governance should account for ES values. Scholars 590 
have argued that ES values are promising for sustainable governance (Laurans & Mermet, 591 
2014). In our case, the social perceptions and values attached to ESs (i.e., seafood and natural 592 
habitat reserves) could serve as an example. In practice, however, comparing with marketable 593 
services, many intangible and vulnerable ESs are often excluded from governance. The 594 
reliability and the acceptance of ES values and related approaches are also problematic in 595 
many cases (Freestone et al., 2014; Xu et al., 2003). Therefore, rules are required that 596 
emphasize a systematic ES-related database and tools, which should be built on existing 597 
information systems (information rules); meanwhile, the data and tools should be 598 
communicated across ecological and administrative boundaries (Primmer & Furman, 2012). 599 
To make the non-marketable services inclusive, the importance of those services and their 600 
spatial distribution should be taken into account when, for instance, designing ecological 601 
compensation (payoff rules). 602 
Lastly, the economic choices for use rights, which are stimulated by attaching prices to ESs 603 
and their proxies, are also a key aspect for formulating ES-specific rules. Previous research 604 
revealed that administrative control and sanctions may cause less efficient use of ESs 605 
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(Boisvert et al., 2013). It is argued that the institutions that draw on economic choices for use 606 
rights could become more flexible and cost effective when dealing with ES issues (Davis & 607 
Gartside, 2001; Mansfield, 2006). Therefore, choice and payoff rules should create scarcity 608 
for vulnerable services and increase users’ incentives to change their choices and their gains 609 
and losses (Boisvert et al., 2013; Lockie, 2013). Meanwhile, to make the economic selection 610 
function well, it is also necessary to design transparent trading rules and explicit use property 611 
as the case of Qingdao showed (choice rules).  612 
To conclude, many international coastal and marine regions are looking for new institutional 613 
arrangements with the goal of integrating ESs for sustainable development. In this context, 614 
the developed evaluative framework of rules-in-use provides a method to assess and guide the 615 
design of existing institutional arrangements. In doing so, of particular importance is the 616 
systemic uptake of the above discussed socio-spatial and economic aspects. In this way, our 617 
research contributes to the current development of coastal and marine governance and 618 
provides information on potential institutional innovations to address coastal and marine 619 
dynamics, uncertainties, and complexities. 620 
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